Abstract
and every formal model-based description of the phenomenon is wrong in an unknown, 48 systematic fashion. One consequence of this, I think, is that while it is usually easy to 49 construct artificial scenarios in which any given procedure misbehaves, it is often difficult 50 to know what implications they might have for the real world scientific problems they 51 approximate.
52
To illustrate how easy it is to tell a misleading story, consider the behaviour of the 53 Bayes factor -a procedure I presume Gronau and Wagenmakers would endorse as sensible
54
-when presented with a minor variation of their Example 1. In this scenario there are two measure zero. The true probability of success in a frequentist sense is lim n→∞ (n − 1)/n = 66 1, and similarly, the posterior expected value of θ for the unknown quantity model M 2 67 converges on θ = 1 in the large sample limit. In any sense that a pragmatic scientist would 68 care about, the general law would count as the "correct" account for the phenomenon. The Bayes factor P (x|M 1 )/P (x|M 2 ) is therefore 0, and selects against the general law M 1
73
with certainty even though M 1 makes an "almost exactly true" prior prediction, whereas
74
M 2 assigns the same degree of prior belief to the true rule θ = 1 as it does to the exact 75 opposite rule, θ = 0.
76
To a statistician the reason for this misbehaviour is obvious, and rather boring: a for sensible judgement, the scientist would (quite correctly) disregard the Bayes factor and 90 1 While there are many people who assert that "a single failure is enough to falsify a theory", I confess I have not yet encountered anyone willing to truly follow this principle in real life.
2 For instance, Gelman, Carlin, Stern & Rubin (2004, p586-587) present an analogous convergence result for the posterior distribution P (θ|x) within a single model M. The result generalises to the Bayes factor by noting that the Bayes factor identifies a model with the prior predictive distribution P (x|M). Substituting P (x|M) for the role of P (x|θ) in their derivation produces the necessary result. make the sensible choice. Importantly though, the fact that the Bayes factor does something 91 unhelpful in a contrived example designed to make it misbehave tells us very little -one 92 way or the other -about whether it is useful in real life. The example I chose is silly, and 93 its evidentiary value is minimal.
94
Viewed more generally, I find it difficult to know how to apply simple examples to Critically, the reason this seems to happen is that there are factors v that influence literature. This is a theme I have explored across multiple papers in the last several years.
237
To model sensitivity to sampling we relied on earlier work by Tenenbaum and Griffiths overfitting. This is not an unreasonable concern, but I find myself at a loss as to how cross- 
273
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